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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMEN"r OF THE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Leonardo Rayes, appeals from the conviction 
judgment of Aggravated Robbery, a felony in the first degree, 
in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake Countv, State 
cf Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. 
DISPOSITION THE L01.JER COURT 
0n March 10, 1983, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson nresided 
the jurv trial where the Appellant was found guilty of the offense 
Aggravated Robberv, a felonv in the first degree. He was sub-
- Hcntl;1 sentenced to the indeterminate term of five years to life 
e State Prison to run consecutivelv with the sentence he 
cu,rentlv serving. Apnellant was not fined for this offense. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction and a rer;ir 1 1 
the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Leonardo Rayes, the Appellant, and Mr. Ibian Ortiz, t: 
co-defendant, were brought to trial as co-defendants on Januar:1 2; 
1983. On that same day, Judge Wilkinson granted a continuance fc: 
this trial because defense counsel were given, only after theic 
request, approximately 15 pages of su,pplemental police reports M'. 
previously submitted to them after proper formal discovery request 
A second trial date was set for February 7, 1983, and a continuanc: 
was granted until February 14, 1983. 
During the second trial, which began on February 14, 198' 
and was held before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, the 
declared a mistrial as to the Appellant when the iury saw him 
shackled, and in prison clothes. At that point, a severance was 
granted between the two co-defendants. Mr. Ortiz's trial proceece 
and he was convicted as charged. Mr. Rayes' third trial date was 
set for March 9, 1983, and orovides the basis for this appeal. 
Richard Bullock, the prosecution's first witness testifie: 
that on Septebmer 20, 1982, a robbery occurred at the Oualitv n;_; 
Gas Station located at 3910 South 900 East. There were two indi· 
viduals involved in the robbery. Richard Bul J od: w,qs the cashie· 
and only employee on duty at the time of the rohberv, which '.v3S 
approximately 9:00 p.m. that night (T.17). 
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One of the robbers had a gun and commanded Mr. Bullock 
lie down on the floor while the cash register was emptied 
; Ji ilr. 8ullock originally reported the amount of money 
, iken '.vas under $1 70. 00, but later admitted he was mis taken 
.ibout the amount. Mr. Bullock described the clothes the two men 
.1ere wearing (T .18), and noted that both individuals snoke with 
an accent and probably were not speaking Enslish, but he could 
net nositively identify the language they were using (T. 20). 
In his initial account to the nolice, Mr. Bullock failed 
to report this accent to the police (T .31). He also originally 
both men as black, but then stated that they had black 
features but were lighter in skin coloring; and then he later 
stated that one of them could have been Mexican (T. 24). Prior to 
the mistrial granted before Judge Fredrick, he testified under 
Jath that the one he believed was Mexican was the co-defendant, Mr. 
lbian Ortiz. On his subsequent testimony, Mr. Bullock's descrip-
tion of Mr. Rayes gradually changed to fit Appellant's apnearance. 
'.!r. Bullock admitted his original description to the nolice may 
ha'.•e been mistaken (T. 30). 
During the third trial setting the court sustained the 
'"tate's objections concerning cross-examination of Mr. Bullock, who 
"
73 s the onlv eyewitness. Defense counsel attempted to question Mr. 
Sullock about reports of mistaken eyewitness identification (T. 34-5), 
never allowed to fully explore the strength of Mr. Bullock's 
a puint which the Appellant now appeals. 
During this same "third" trial, defense counsel requested 
mid-trial continuance, as a defense witness, Ozzie Ahmed, 
'.nne unn. •t iced, due to the State's delay in turning over the 
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police reports, until the day before the trial when the infoc, 
was disclosed in a report. Defense counsel's investi»ator 
to find Mr. Ahmed throughout the day, but was unsuccess''ll 
this witness the defense was unable to present critical infoF.a• 
to the jury. 
At about 8: 50 p. m. , the evening of the robber" in quest::· 
a suspicious vehicle was reported bv Mr. Ahmed in the vicinit·• ;' 
the Triangle Service Station at 4200 South Highland Drive--a]o•J' 
1 1/2 miles away from the scene of the robbery (T. 64, 
Ahmed, supposedly, had not only S'?'en the vehicle but had also 
the number of occupants in the vehicle. Defense counsel was uni'. 
to establish this evidence during the trial through anv other 
witnesses (T.81). 
The police investigated the suspicious vehicle and estat:: 
the fact that it was registered to a Ms. Peterson (T.81, 89). 
around 10:00 or 10:30 p.m. that evening, Salt Lake Citv Police 
Officer Robert Robinson stopped a car fitting the "suspicious 
vehicle" description reported earlier. Three Hisnanic f'.lales ·:e·' 
in the car: Pedro Diaz, Santiago Crespo, and Ibian Ortiz. Anoe .. 
was not in this car which was nrobablv the reoorted vehic:. 
ARGU11EN'r 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOITI'Jl, J:'ULL C:l\OSS-
EXAMINATION OF THE STATE'S CHIEF \HT'1ESS 
REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDE'.ITI'°TCA'rION 
In the case at bar, evewitness identification nro i'e 
crucial link in the State's case The Defendant ',\noel lant ! 
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3 erious questions about the possibility of misidentification, 
1 1 lurlin" :Tr Bullock's admission that his original descriotions to 
no lice ma:• have been mistaken (T. 30). The Sixth Amendment of 
. e ·•nc ted State;, Constitution requires the accused "to be per-
to introduce all relevant and admissible evidence." The test 
ul r!1 e relevancy of such testimony is "whether the proffered evi-
would render the desired inference more probable then [sic] it Jenee 
!:le without such evidence." State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1/.60, 
i263 IUt 1980). 
Courts have long that identification testimony 
Dee ents svecial problems of reliability hecause the in-court testi-
Jon:· of an eyewitness can be devastatingly oersuasive. U.S. v. 
515 F. 2d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1975). It is essential the 
'Jefendant be allowed to fully develoo the conditions under which 
identification was made and probe whether the identification 
cern.<iins unqualified and certain after full cross-examination. Here, 
.·nere mis-identification is the defense, the Defendant should have 
)een afforded an opportunity to elicit answers ooich would imoeach 
veracitv, the capacity to observe, and imoartiality, and the 
of the witness. McCormick, Evidence (2d Cleary Ed. 
'. 9 • ' l Section 2 2 at 4 9 . 
On cross-examination of Mr. Bullock, the eyewitness defense 
stated 
ll:n•e vou had an opportunity, Mr. Bullock, to read 
, .• articles or wath anv television programs 
'1n. an identification, eyewitness identifi-
11_ LlJn 
( .\ 1)bjection, Your Honor. Irrelevant. 
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Q. I think it goes to credihilitv, Your Honor 
Q. Have voubecome aware of situations, l'r llll][, 
in which persons who have r1ade e"e·.,·itnc:o· 
identifications have in fact been •vrong about 
identifications? 
CA. Objection, Your Honor. It is irrelevant 
J. 
(T.34-35). 
I am going to sustain it. 
In People v. Clark, 47 Cal.Rptr. 407 P.2d 20l '" 
the defendant's conviction for col'1I'litting lewd acts on the 'i0: 
a child under fourteen was based on "the testimonv o:C ':he a'.'.c,,: 
victim herself. The defendant sought to establish that 'lee •e,: 
many concerning sexual intercourse with t'ie defendant • ..·as 
cated, but was not allowed to question her about thdt 
might have undermined her credibilitv. 
The California Supreme Court noted the trial court 
perly limited the scope of cross examination and the recenrion 
other evidence that went to the alleged victim's credi:iili:·: 
reversing the conviction. The court exDlained· 
[D]efendant put in issue the orosecutrix' 
motives, the possibilitv of fabrication, and 
the role fantasv mav have nlaved Hence, 
evidence rebutting her statement 
relevant to the issues involved. The iMnro-
prietv, therefore, of such e"idence 
.·on of the prose-
cutrix . is clear. 
Id. at 296. 
Authorities agree the broade"c 
examination aimed at impeach int• cl '-11 rne'; l TI 
(Chadbourn Revision) Sect ion 90>', and '-'cC<>r-; c :· 1 • 
Ed. 1972) Section 30 
prosecuting witness further deprives him of 
. , 1 ·,, en·'"'ent right to confront his accusers. 
In t 11e case of State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P.1044, 
•his Cnurt reversed a conviction for violation of oro-
. i' i •ion laws. This Court exoressed its concern for the need to 
,,e,e:." eight of cross-examination by stating, "In a judicial 
ecricalion the ri2ht of a cross-examination is an absolute right 
-iece privilege of the party against whom the witness is 
. [C]ross-examination of a witness may not only modify 
J:· e:·.:cc1in but it ma:r destroy the evidence in chief." Failure to 
:Jll crnss-examination prejudiced Mr. Raves just as it had 
the defendant in State v. Zolantakis. 
Court again addressed the question of inhibited cross-
·:·,:.inatic•n in ' . .Jeber Basin Water Conservancv District v. Ward, 10 
34 · P. 2d 862. 864-65 (1959). In holding there had been 
cestriction of cross-examination of the condemnee, this 
·seated. "[T]he purpose of cross-examination is to give 
e"<ar:: co•.msel the ooportunity not only to inquire into uncer-
'11ties relating to the testimonv in chief, but to test its 
'fuate:rer mav tend to explain, modify, or contradict 
c'.c..:·ect e\·idence should be allowed." 
de'initive statement from the United States Suoreme 
-·en i.-:i•ation of cross-exarlination and the Sixth Amend-
'"" ::1 c.·1ith •· Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1963). The defendant 
··c:e·· ·:n; l\, • .-·11 s2 les ,,f na1·cotics and was not allowed to 
\..., ;1: ic.:.ec11tion :-c·:- ':he chief r.\ritness' name or address. The 
" ' '
1
• ire its Jutv to orotect the witness from nossible 
retaliation for testifying did not outweigh the defend;:int 's r1 2• 
to cross-examination. The Supreme Court stated, "[P]reju<lice 
ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witnPss 1 
proper setting and put the weight of his testimonv and his ere' 
lity to a test, without which the jury cannot <:airly apnraise ,,, 
Id. at 132, quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 638-'' 
(1931). The Court also noted the irnnortant role of cross-exal'lir.-
ation in exposing falsehood and in bringing out truth. Smith 
Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), at 131. 
In the present case, Appellant'£ defense was seriousb 
damaged by his inability to challenge the credibility of the or.c 
witness and show bias on the part of a witness testifying a;caino: 
him upon whose testimony his conviction rested. Had he been 
extended the necessary latitude in cross-examination as riandates 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 34 7 P. 2d 
364-65 (1959), and Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), che 
could have had a reasonable doubt about his identification. 
The trial court's improper limitation of cross-examinati 
in the present case prejudiced Appellant. As a result, his 
Amendment right to confront his accuser was effectively denied 
His conviction under these circumstances cannot be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE FAILURE TO CONTINUE THE '?RIAL TO ALLO\•J 
APPELLAin TO SECURE THE PRESE'7CE OF 1\ CRUCIAL 
WITNESS DENIED HIM HIS SIXTH A.c'1ENDME'1T RIGHT 
TO COMPULSORY PROCESS. 
During the first day of trial, Appellant's attorne" 
a brief continuance so an essential witness, who had iust he?n 
covered, could be brought in to testify. Invest1gaturs .. "· ''r 
had tried, unsuccessfully, to find the wi rness, 'lzc:ie 1\li:·,,.,' ' 
-S-
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trial court was aware Appellant would not have been prejudiced 
a continuance because he was already serving time at the Utah 
P1ison (T.77). Ozzie Ahmed, the desired witness, saw and 
'epurted a suspicious vehicle around 8: 50 p. m. on the evening in 
c;uestion, only minutes before the robbery at Quality Oil. Mr. 
!hmed reported this suspicious vehicle to Mr. Rencher who was work-
ing at the Triangle Service Station at 4200 South Highland Drive 
IT -2J As a result of his observation, the police investigated 
and, at about 10: 00 or 10: 30 p. m. , stopped the reported vehicle 
rT.33-9). Three Hispanic men were in the vehicle, one of them 
)eing the co-defendant, Mr. Ibian Ortiz; but Mr. Rayes, the 
;opellant, was not in the car. Ozzie Ahmed's testimony was crucial 
because he would have testified Mr. Rayes was not in the car at 
8 50 p. m. , which was just prior to the robbery. 
Although there are no Utah cases directly on point, in State 
419 P.2d 789 0Jash. 1966), the court held that denial of 
a continuance requested by the defendant constituted reversible 
e'·ror. In State v Watson, an eyewitness, who could support the defen-
8ant 's theory of self-defense to a killin12;, was located and agreed 
'.o testify. The witness failed to appear at the trial, however, 
defense counsel's motion for a continuance in that case was 
e;:nneously denied. As in State v lfatson, defense counsel here made 
efforts to locate Mr. Ahmed through investigators. If 
· '" ·iefense' s motion for a continuance had been granted, Mr. Ahmed, 
.: '· l like 1 ihood, would have been found. 
In Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1976), the Sunreme 
·=' of Alaska reversed and remanded a first degree murder conviction 
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because the trial court denied a one-dav continuancP tn sec_ 
testimony of an absent police officer. Alaska follows 
rule that the trial court's decision to denv a continu1n1·r 
remain intact on aopeal absent a showing of abuse of disccpr:· 
Id. at 71. The court went on to state an arbitrarv refusdl 
due process and thar the issue can be resolved hv examining t'.e 
reasons for the requested continuance. Id. at 72. In · 
the reasons for the request, the court articulated a test tc ,. 
deciding whether a mid-trial continuance should be granted :.2, 
seven factors which constitute the test are: 
1. Whether the testimony is material to the case: 
2. Whether the testimony can be elicited from anothec 
source; 
3. Whether the testimony is cumulative, 
4. Probability of securing the absent witness in a 
reasonable time; 
5. Whether the requesting partv was diligent and act:": 
in good faith; 
6. The inconvenience to the court and/or others. anc 
7. The likelihood that the testfrionv would ha·:e 
the jury's verdict. 
Although Salazar v. State, is not a Utah case, at 
least two of the seven factors have been adopted bv this 
State v. Hartman, 101 Utah 29.'3, 119 P :>d 112 11941) 
Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 P 
to the case at bar it is clear that Ahmed's tec;tic-.nn "i" 
it could not be elicited fror-1 :m·1bod" el:.c 
the witness could, in all likelir1(>ood be 01r"'' in 1 '·"l1'' 
0 
•" C') nc;el had acted diligently and in good faith; Anpellant 
'i-i':e been prejudiced by the delay, and inconvenience to 
_"ff: the State would have been minil'lal; and finally, the 
-·'-on: ,_.;oulJ probably have affected the jury's verdict. 
Washint?on v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), sunports Aooel-
;'HJSition. In v. Texas, the court reversed a 
1e1- -c•Jn·:iction because the defendant was denied his Sixth Amend-
-:'."'.· :io'it co compulsory process when he was not allowed to call a 
- 0 :e:-ial ·_.;i tness vital to his defense. The court stated: 
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and 
:o compel their attendance, if necessary, is in 
plain terms the right to present a defense, the 
right to present the defendant's version of the 
as 0ell as the prosecution's to the jury so 
it mav decide where the truth lies. Just as an 
accused has the right to confront the prosecution's 
witnesses for the puroose of challenging their 
testimony, he has the-right to present his own 
·.;i tnesses to establish a defense. This right is a 
fundamental element of due process of law. 
ct 19 
case at bar, Appellant, in all likelihood, could have produced 
\r.:r.ec to testify to the events he personally observed if the 
:::3' court had granted a brief continuance. By not allowing Mr. 
·es to produce this witness, however, the court effectively denied 
'-is Amendment right to compulsory witnesses, and his con-
:ion should_ therefore, be reversed. 
CONCLL'SION 
f'ie t-iJl court erred in not allowing full cross-examination 
;, ,." '' :::ain witness regarding knowledge of eyewitness identi-
,r, F,ii luce to allow Appellant to elicit answers from this 
-11-
witness, which could impeach his veracitv, credibilitv, caoacit·.· 
observe,and impartialitv, denied Anpellant his Sixth Anenclr:ie11 
right to confrontation. Failure of the trial court to >'rant 
continuance to allow Appellant to secure a material witness 
could have testified on his behalf, further denied Aonellant s 
Amendment right to compulsory process. In the interest of just':: 
any conviction based on either of these violations of Appellant': 
Sixth Amendment rights should be dismissed. 
Y -' re day 
tf J};)J 
BROOKE C. HELLS 
Attornev for Appellant 
DELIVERED two copies of the foregoing to the Attornev 
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